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Financial services and consumer protection after the 
crisis 
Folarin Akinbami
*
 
Durham Law School 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose- The purpose of this paper is to examine the approaches to consumer 
protection in UK financial services before and after the global financial crisis. 
Design/methodology/approach- This paper reviews the literature on Behavioural 
economics and Psychology, and uses it as the basis for a critique of the UK‟s 
approach to the supervision of financial services firms and the protection of their 
consumers.  
Findings- Non-interventionist approaches to consumer protection, which are based on 
the traditional theories of the Law and Economics movement, have failed. As a result, 
there is now a shift in thinking towards more interventionist approaches.   
Research limitations/implications- By understanding the likely impact of the 
regulatory reforms the academic research community can assist the regulator to 
understand the best way to ensure desirable outcomes for users (consumers) of 
financial services. 
Originality/value- The moves to reform UK financial regulation after the crisis have 
only recently gotten underway and a lot of the reforms have not been widely debated 
or written on.  
Keywords consumer protection, Rational Choice Theory, intensive supervision 
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Paper type Conceptual paper 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is, arguably, the most significant financial 
crisis to occur since the Great Crash of 1929, which led to the Great Depression. The 
crisis of 2007-2009 was caused by a number of factors for example flawed monetary 
policy, excessive and uncontrolled use of financial innovation, the proliferation of 
shadow banking activities and inadequate corporate governance structures within 
banks and other financial services firms (Avgouleas, 2009).To a large extent, it was 
also a manifestation of regulators‟ failure to maintain the overall stability of the 
financial system. Apart from this failure to maintain systemic stability, there were also 
some failures to protect consumers, for example regulators‟ approaches to the 
supervision of financial firms were not assertive enough thus resulting in a situation 
where a large number of borrowers are struggling to pay back mortgages as a result of 
irresponsible lending.  
 
Apart from this there have been other examples of financial practitioners acting in a 
way that was detrimental to consumers, for example the scandals arising from the 
mis-selling of retail financial products such as personal pensions and endowment 
mortgages (Gray, 2004). Such incidents illustrate how firms and practitioners in the 
financial services industry are able to exploit an unfair advantage they have over their 
consumers (investors) in terms of superior information and expertise. Such 
opportunistic behaviour, arguably, indicates the need for tighter regulation of financial 
services. 
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This article looks at some of the principal theories on why we intervene, in markets, 
to protect consumers. It also looks at how the financial crisis has led to a re-thinking 
of how this might be done. In so doing, it examines the regulatory philosophies that 
underpinned consumer protection regulation in UK financial services before the crisis, 
as well as the new ideas that might replace them in the new post-crisis era. 
 
APPROACHES TO CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION 
The government or regulator tasked with consumer protection will often have to 
balance the interests of consumers on the one hand with those of the sellers or 
suppliers on the other hand. To this extent, its approaches to consumer protection 
regulation will be interventionist, non-interventionist or a mixture of both. The non-
interventionist and interventionist approaches to consumer protection will now be 
discussed in turn. 
 
Non-interventionist approaches 
Non-interventionist approaches emphasize allowing the consumers and sellers the 
freedom to make bargains and contracts without external interference from 
government or regulators. The non-interventionist approaches are promotion of 
competition (between the different suppliers or sellers) (Yeung, 2004), the use of 
information disclosure (Howells, 2005), the use of caveat emptor (Mcmeel and Virgo, 
2001) and the reliance on private enforcement mechanisms (Polinsky and Shavell, 
2000, Shavell, 1993, Van Den Bergh, 2008). 
 
The „Chicago School‟ of economic thought has traditionally been a supporter of non-
interventionist approaches. Their arguments are based on a deep-seated belief in the 
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efficacy of the free market as a means of organising or allocating resources 
(Friedman, 1974). They are also founded on a great deal of scepticism of government 
intervention in economic affairs (Friedman, 1974). The argument is that in the 
absence of government intervention the free market functions at least as well as, and 
probably better than, any other type of economic arrangement (Friedman and 
Friedman, 2002) ((Wall, 1972). The reason for this, according to Chicagoans, is that 
voluntary exchange is the most efficient method of allocating resources, promoting 
individual choice and preserving political freedoms (Friedman and Friedman, 2002).  
 
This belief in free markets, minimal government and the promotion of private 
enterprise is, in turn, founded on the proposition that human beings maximise their 
own self-interests and are therefore rational economic creatures (Stigler, 1982). This 
is known as Rational Choice Theory. Rational Choice Theory is, in many ways, the 
foundation for the law and economics movement (Jacoby, 2000). It is based on the 
premise that human beings are maximisers of their satisfaction, or utility, and that 
when faced with a set of choices, will always pick the option that they believe 
maximises their satisfaction or utility (Becker, 1978, Posner, 1990). This premise is, 
in turn, based on the assumption that when making choices people have adequate 
information (to aid them in making those choices) and the ability to properly process 
that information (Ogus, 1994). Consequently individual choice must be preserved, 
while limiting external or government interference (in individual‟s decision-making 
about their welfare) to the improvement of information flows (Ogus, 1994). Rational 
Choice Theory, therefore, seems to argue for limited, if any, regulation or other 
government intervention, since individuals know how to maximise their utility and are 
capable of doing so.  
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A major criticism of non-interventionist approaches arises from a significant defect of 
Rational Choice Theory. This criticism can be found in the Behavioural Economics 
and Psychology literature. The problem with Rational Choice Theory is that people do 
not always make rational choices. Individuals can, and do, make inferior decisions 
with regards to their welfare- decisions that they would not have made if they had 
complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities and unlimited self-control (Jolls et 
al., 1998). This arises because people often use heuristics (rules of thumb) which are 
aimed at making complex tasks, of assessing probabilities and predicting values, 
simpler, but which can sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors (Avgouleas, 
2008). There is a wealth of empirical studies, in both Behavioural Economics and 
Psychology, that show that the use of heuristics, such as the availability heuristic 
(Slovic, 2000) and the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2004), results in cognitive biases 
(cognitive weaknesses) in individuals‟ decision-making, which, in turn, lead them to 
make systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Some examples of cognitive 
biases are overconfidence (Shiller, 2000), probability neglect (Sunstein, 2005) and 
loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Kahneman et al., 1990, Kahneman and 
Knetsch, 1991). Individuals, thus, suffer from bounded rationality (Jolls et al., 1998, 
Simon, 1955), bounded self-control (Frederick et al., 2002, Jolls et al., 1998) and the 
effect of framing (Camerer, 2000, Johnson et al., 2000) when making choices 
regarding their welfare.  
  
Interventionist approaches 
Interventionist approaches to consumer protection are characterised by the greater 
involvement of government or regulators in the monitoring of suppliers and sellers of 
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goods and services in a bid to protect the interests of consumers. Typical 
interventionist approaches include bans and regulation, altering the default rules and 
risk-sharing (Howells, 2005). Interventionist approaches in financial services include 
conduct of business regulation and product regulation. 
 
A significant justification for interventionist approaches comes from the extensive 
scholarly empirical literature on the behaviour of individual consumers, which 
concludes that Rational Choice Theory is a simplistic theory that has little 
correspondence with the real world (Jacoby, 2000, Jacoby et al., 1998, Peter and 
Olson, 2008). Human behaviour is a complex function of many known and unknown 
factors, and although economic variables play an important role in our choices, there 
are many other variables which also play a role in our choices, for example 
psychological, sociological, cultural and environmental variables (Jacoby, 2000).  The 
upshot of this is that the application of Rational Choice Theory will not work for all 
markets and all consumers all of the time or in all situations (Jacoby, 2000).  
 
Another significant justification for interventionist approaches to consumer protection 
is information inadequacy. Information is necessary in order for markets to function 
properly- for a market to function well buyers must have enough information to help 
them evaluate products (Hayek, 1945), and there should be as much information 
available as consumers are willing to pay for in order to improve the quality of their 
choices (Breyer, 1982). This is, however, not always the case, for a number of 
reasons. 
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The first of these reasons is that information is sometimes expensive to produce and 
difficult to restrict to only those who pay (Breyer, 1982), therefore there is less of an 
incentive to produce such information (Asch, 1988). This can lead to the production 
of inadequate or too little information (Sunstein, 1990), and thus constitutes an 
argument in favour of regulation.  
 
The second reason is that one of the parties to a transaction may deliberately try to 
mislead or deceive the other party, by conveying false information or omitting 
important facts- the fact that individual consumers will often have incomplete 
information, coupled with the significant costs involved in determining the quality of 
a particular good or service, create favourable conditions for fraud to take place 
(Darby and Karni, 1973). Although there are other ways of dealing with this particular 
problem, for example service contracts, leasing arrangements, extensive warranties, 
client relationships and branding (Darby and Karni, 1973), regulation should not be 
ruled out.   
 
The third reason is that even if the necessary information is provided the buyer may 
be unable to evaluate all the characteristics of the products or services on offer, for 
example a lay man cannot readily evaluate the competence of a doctor or lawyer 
(Breyer, 1982). The result of such information asymmetries between buyers and 
sellers (where the sellers have more knowledge about the quality of the goods on sale 
than the buyer) is often described as a “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). In a 
market for lemons there is an incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise 
because the returns for good quality accrue to all sellers rather than to the individual 
seller (Akerlof, 1970). The market will, therefore, supply quality at inefficiently low 
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levels (Cheffins, 1997). Although there are other ways of dealing with the market for 
lemons (that is, the effects of quality uncertainty) for example the use of guarantees 
and brand-names, there is still a strong case for licensing and other forms of 
regulation, in order to increase the welfare of all parties (Akerlof, 1970).  
 
The problem of quality uncertainty is particularly relevant with regards to experience 
goods rather than search goods (Nelson, 1970). With search goods there is less danger 
the buyer will make incorrect purchase decisions because the relevant characteristics 
can be known prior to purchase, whereas with experience goods there is a greater 
likelihood of unsuitable purchases because the relevant characteristics will often only 
be ascertainable after purchase and use (Breyer, 1982). The problem of quality 
uncertainty is also relevant with regard to credence goods because it is difficult to 
ascertain their characteristics or their quality even after they have been used or 
consumed. The problem of quality uncertainty is, therefore, particularly relevant to 
banking and other financial services because long-term savings and investment 
products tend to be credence goods rather than search or experience goods. The 
problem of quality uncertainty thus contributes positively to the argument in favour of 
regulation. 
 
The fourth reason why there might be inadequate information in a market is that the 
market may simply not be competitive enough to provide all the information that 
consumers would be willing to pay for, for example until the US government 
mandated disclosure, accurate information was unavailable, to most buyers, regarding 
the fuel economy for cars, durability of light bulbs, nicotine content of cigarettes or 
care requirements for textiles (Breyer, 1982).  
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Having looked at the four reasons it is clear that information inadequacy poses a very 
strong justification for regulation. By making information more extensively available, 
accurate and affordable, regulation can protect buyers against the adverse 
consequences of information inadequacy thus encouraging the operation of healthy 
markets (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). To this extent regulation is a desirable thing. 
 
Morality presents another justification for interventionist approaches to consumer 
protection. This is because capitalism itself encourages the baser human motives such 
as self-interest and the desire for personal profit, while at the same time discouraging 
the more traditional moral virtues such as honesty, integrity, self-sacrifice and the 
charitable instinct (Barry, 1991). Thus, if an unregulated market is likely to produce 
self-serving conduct which breaches widely accepted standards of morality, then there 
could be an argument made for the introduction of regulation into such a market 
(Cheffins, 1997). 
 
In attempting to curb conduct that breaches widely accepted standards of morality, 
regulation can also promote confidence in the market, since unethical or improper 
conduct is precisely the thing that undermines public confidence in the market (Barry, 
1991, Cheffins, 1997). Morality thus provides a good justification for regulation. 
 
A further justification for interventionist approaches is paternalism. It is largely based 
on the weaknesses of Rational Choice Theory. The perceived inability of individuals 
to make correct choices with regards to their welfare is a justification for regulation 
that is paternalistic in nature- such regulation is based, largely, on the belief that the 
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market is unable to regulate itself in a particular area of social or economic activity, 
thus requiring government initiatives that are interventionist in nature (Avgouleas, 
2005). Paternalism itself has been defined as “the interference with a person‟s liberty 
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests or values of the person being coerced” (Dworkin, 1971, Ogus, 2010, 
Van De Veer, 1986). It is a powerful justification for regulation, even when other 
justifications, such as externalities, are also appropriate (Ogus, 1994), and it has even 
been argued that, very often paternalism is inevitable (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). 
 
The problem with paternalism is that it is viewed by some, especially libertarians, as 
coercive, restrictive on choice and freedom and it blurs the boundaries of state 
intervention (Friedman and Friedman, 2002, Hayek, 1960, Hayek, 1973, Nozick, 
1974). To overcome the criticisms of paternalism, Sunstein and Thaler have come up 
with the idea of libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). They argue that 
arguments against paternalism are based on a false assumption (that people always 
make choices that are in their best interests) and misconceptions that there are viable 
alternatives to paternalism and that paternalism always involves coercion 
(O'donoghue and Rabin, 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). Libertarian paternalism is 
a fairly weak and non-intrusive version of paternalism, whereby choices are not 
blocked but planners self-consciously attempt to move people in welfare-promoting 
directions (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003), thus making the regime both libertarian and 
paternalistic at the same time. 
 
A good look at some of the things that paternalistic regulation has been put in place to 
avoid, for example under-aged smoking and drinking and the failure to wear seatbelts 
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(Dworkin, 1971),  makes it clear to us that individuals, if left to their own devices, do 
not always make rational decisions or welfare-maximising choices. This therefore 
counts as a good justification for intervention in order to ensure their welfare. 
 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY BEFORE 
THE CRISIS  
The Regulatory Objectives 
UK financial regulation in the run-up to the financial crisis was (and remains) a 
mixture of both interventionist and non-interventionist approaches. The UK financial 
regulator, the FSA, has four statutory objectives (which can be found in the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)) and these are the protection of consumers 
(of financial products and services), maintaining confidence in the financial system, 
reducing financial crime and promoting public understanding of the financial system 
(FSMA sections 2(2) and 3). Consumer protection is therefore one of the main aims 
of UK financial services regulation, and the regime contains measures aimed at 
ensuring consumers have adequate protection when dealing with financial services 
providers (FSMA Parts 15 and 16). The fact that consumer protection is explicitly 
outlined as one of the regulatory objectives makes it one of the central aims of the 
regime and this is definitely desirable. 
 
The multiple objectives of the regulator could, however, be problematic, since there is 
the potential for confusion with regards to how to prioritise the different objectives. 
Some statutes set out objectives that are mutually at odds with each other, and 
achieving one of such objectives may necessarily involve trading off performance in 
relation to other stated objectives (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Regulatory scholars 
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often fail to pay enough attention to the ideological differences which underpin law or 
regulation, because rather than focus on the differences between regulatory goals they 
focus on the differences between compliance strategies (Haines and Gurney, 2003).  
 
The FSA‟s stated objectives might not initially appear to be mutually at odds with 
each other, but on a closer examination, it is possible to observe subtle, but significant 
ideological and policy differences among some of its objectives. The potential for 
conflict between its goal of protecting consumers and its goal of educating consumers 
(promoting public understanding of the financial system) provides a good illustration 
of this. The statutory objective of protecting consumers reflects the idea that 
regulation should protect consumers because of information asymmetry, the fact that 
individuals do not always make rational choices (the failures of Rational Choice 
Theory) and the fact that unregulated markets are likely to produce self-serving 
conduct which breaches acceptable standards of morality. This is essentially an 
interventionist approach based on the traditional justifications for using interventionist 
approaches. This provision for consumer protection can be contrasted with two other 
provisions in the statute. The first of these is a proviso to the consumer protection 
objective, which states that consumers must accept personal responsibility for their 
decisions (FSMA section 5(2)(d)). The second is the statutory objective of promoting 
public understanding of the financial system, which is premised on the idea that if 
consumers can be „educated‟ they can be empowered, and will thus be able to look 
after their own interests, thereby reducing  the need for interventionist approaches to 
consumer protection (FSMA sections 2(2)(b) and 4). It is based on Rational Choice 
Theory and incorporates non-interventionist approaches such as information 
disclosure and caveat emptor.  
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There is a strong argument for caution when using information disclosure to make 
consumers responsible for their decisions, since the effectiveness of information 
disclosure as a regulatory technique to empower consumers may be limited (Gray and 
Hamilton, 2006). Caveat emptor is also problematic because it amounts, in effect, to 
abandoning consumers to their fate. It is, therefore, suggested that when a decision is 
being made about which objective to give priority to, the regulator should give the 
consumer protection objective priority over the objective of promoting public 
understanding of the financial system.         
 
Supervision of the financial services industry 
The supervision of the financial services industry has, to date, been based on a 
number of key ideas. These are risk-based regulation, more principles-based 
regulation (MPBR), „light-touch‟ regulation, the enrolment of consumers into the 
regulatory process and the encouragement of firms to treat their customers fairly.  
Risk regulation deals with the management of regulatory or institutional risks for 
example risks that the regulator will not achieve its objectives as a result of the 
misbehaviour of the regulated firms (Black, 2005). This approach potentially gives 
the regulator very wide powers to do whatever is necessary to tackle any issues that 
arise which pose a risk to it attaining its objectives. 
 
More principles-based regulation (MPBR) is based on greater reliance on outcomes-
focused, broad rules (which are known as principles) and less reliance on detailed, 
specific rules (F.S.A, 2007a). The regulator uses eleven over-arching principles, 
which are of a highly general nature, and apply to all firms performing regulated 
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activities in the UK (FSA Handbook PRIN 1.1). They provide a general guide on how 
the regulated firms should behave, for example the sixth principle requires firms to 
pay regard to the interests of their customers and to treat them fairly (FSA Handbook 
PRIN 2.1.1). Apart from the principles, there is a second layer of rules, which are 
more detailed and which deal with specific matters, such as conduct of business and 
the persons subject to regulation under the regime. The principles and detailed rules 
represent a more interventionist approach to the protection of financial services 
consumers, and are therefore desirable. Prioritising the principles over the detailed 
rules is also desirable because they are broader in scope than the detailed rules.  
 
The third key idea that has influenced the way in which the UK financial industry has 
been supervised is the idea of „light touch‟ regulation. This is characterised by the 
implementation of the supervisory regime in a business-friendly manner. It is also 
characterised by reluctance, on the part of the regulator, to interfere with how firms 
conduct their business, for example reluctance to review firms‟ business models or to 
take a tough stance with them. It is non-interventionist, and has been considered a key 
factor in the regulatory failings that contributed to the financial crisis (Sants, 2010). 
To this extent, it serves as a good illustration of how non-interventionist approaches 
fail to deliver on regulatory objectives such as the protection of consumers. 
 
The enrolment of consumers into the regulatory process is another key idea that has 
influenced the regulator‟s attitude to the supervision of UK financial services. 
Enrolment is the natural progression from decentred regulation, which is, in turn, 
based on the idea that governments do not have a monopoly on regulation, and that 
regulation occurs within and between other social actors with or without the 
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government‟s involvement or approval (Black, 2001). These other actors will be 
„enrolled‟ into the regulatory process implicitly or explicitly, and will play a part in 
shaping the regulation. One group of such social actors is consumers, and they are 
enrolled into the regime based on the requirements that the regulator educates 
consumers (FSMA section 4) and encourages them to take responsibility for their 
decisions (FSMA section 2(3)(c)). Enrolment, therefore, embodies the notion of 
caveat emptor (Davies, 2000, Mcmeel and Virgo, 2001), and is therefore a non-
interventionist approach to consumer protection. Applying caveat emptor to financial 
services supervision is problematic because it amounts to abandoning vulnerable 
consumers to their fate. If consumers suffer from cognitive biases, and need 
regulation in order to protect them, strategies of enrolment which make the consumers 
the de facto regulators ultimately do not make sense.  
 
Encouraging firms to treat their customers fairly is another key idea in the supervision 
of UK financial services. This is done through the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) 
initiative, which is largely based on the FSA‟s principles, particularly Principle 6, 
which requires firms to pay regard to the interests of their customers and to treat them 
fairly (FSA Handbook PRIN 2.1.1). Under the initiative the regulator set firms six 
outcomes to achieve in terms of consumer protection which include, for example, the 
suitability of advice provided to consumers and the provision of products and services 
to an acceptable standard (F.S.A, 2007b) . The TCF initiative aims to bring about 
positive changes in the way that financial firms treat their customers, thereby 
delivering better outcomes for consumers (Waters, 2006). This approach has been 
largely non-interventionist, with the regulator giving the regulated the tools to 
improve their approaches towards consumers but leaving the actual implementation of 
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such improvements to the firms and their senior managements (Wilson, 2007). Under 
such a non-interventionist approach the firms did make some progress but there is still 
considerable room for improvement (F.S.A, 2007c, Wilson, 2007). There is therefore 
much more to be done with regard to improving the way firms treat their customers. 
 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY AFTER THE 
CRISIS 
The effects of the financial crisis have been felt in many parts of the world and have 
been very severe indeed. They have led to some substantial changes in the way the 
UK financial services industry is regulated, with potentially significant consequences 
for its consumers. The first change is a change in the FSA‟s philosophy and its 
approach to supervision. The second, and more significant change, is the UK coalition 
government‟s plan to put in place a new financial regulation regime, that will see the 
FSA phased out in 2012, and its functions carried out by the Bank of England and a 
number of new regulators. These two changes will now be discussed in some detail. 
 
The change in the FSA’s philosophy and approach to supervision 
The FSA has carried out reviews looking into the causes of the crisis (F.S.A, 2008, 
Turner, 2009) and consultations on how to improve the regulation of UK financial 
services after the crisis (F.S.A, 2009, F.S.A, 2010). It has acknowledged the failure of 
its non-interventionist approaches, and has signalled its intention to change its 
approach to one that is more interventionist, intrusive and proactive (Sants, 2009). 
This involves some changes in its philosophy and its approach to supervision.  
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In its review of the supervision of Northern Rock it concluded that the way it 
implemented risk regulation may have been incorrect, but that risk regulation works 
in theory (F.S.A, 2008). The idea of risk regulation, therefore, remains key to its 
supervisory approach, with the regulator reiterating its stance that it is not feasible to 
try and prevent all failures (F.S.A, 2008).  It will therefore continue to mitigate risks 
while at the same time fostering innovation and competition. 
 
The idea of more principles-based regulation has been replaced with „outcomes-
focused‟ regulation. Although the principles have been left intact the approach 
towards their application is slightly different. Outcomes-focused regulation is centred 
on intervening in a proactive way, and judging the future decisions of firms based on 
business model and other analysis (Sants, 2010). This represents a more proactive and 
rigorous approach to supervision. It is interventionist and is, arguably, a better way to 
protect consumers. 
 
The idea of „light touch‟ regulation has probably been the biggest casualty of the 
financial crisis. It had already been criticised before the crisis, and is considered a key 
contributor to the regulatory failings that contributed to the crisis (Sants, 2010). As a 
result, the regulator has decided to do away with it, and to replace it with the idea of 
intensive supervision. Intensive supervision involves greater attention to consumer 
outcomes, as well as more intrusive inspections and mitigation of the risks inherent in 
firms‟ business models (Sants, 2009). It also involves identifying and encouraging the 
right culture within the industry (Sants, 2009), thus showing that the regulator is 
beginning to understand how important it is that the culture of putting consumers first 
is encouraged. It also involves a greater willingness to take a tougher stance with 
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firms and to take enforcement action against them where appropriate. Intensive 
supervision is a very interventionist approach to supervision, and is beneficial to 
consumers because it puts their interests high up on the regulatory agenda.  
 
Intensive supervision, however, does not fit in perfectly with the idea of enrolment of 
consumers into the regulatory process. Enrolment remains part of the regulator‟s 
overall supervisory strategy and is comprised of enlightening or empowering 
consumers, on the one hand, and caveat emptor, on the other hand. Although 
enlightened or empowered consumers will complement attempts to implement 
intensive supervision, the same cannot be said of caveat emptor. It is difficult to see 
how caveat emptor can be reconciled with intensive supervision. This means that 
there remains the potential for non-interventionist approaches, such as caveat emptor, 
to reduce the effectiveness of interventionist approaches. 
 
The idea of Treating Customers Fairly remains firmly on the regulator‟s agenda for 
the supervision of firms. The regulator accepts that the TCF initiative has not 
delivered the outcomes that consumers deserve, largely as a result of its 
implementation in a non-interventionist, reactive manner (Sants, 2010, Sants, 2009). 
It has consulted on ways to improve professionalism within the industry (F.S.A, 2009) 
and the way firms handle consumer complaints (F.S.A, 2010). It has also re-focused 
the TCF initiative towards making the retail market work better for consumers, 
avoiding the crystallisation of conduct risks and delivering credible deterrence, and 
prompt and effective redress for consumers (Sants, 2010). This re-focusing represents 
a welcome shift away from non-interventionist approaches, and a desirable move 
towards interventionist approaches to consumer protection. 
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The new financial regulatory regime to replace the FSA 
The coalition government in the UK has decided to get rid of the FSA and to split its 
responsibilities between the Bank of England and a new financial services consumer 
protection agency (currently being referred to as the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA)). In this new regime the Bank of England will be responsible for the overall 
financial stability of the UK financial system, in addition to its already existing 
responsibility for monetary policy. To help it with this, a new prudential supervisory 
body (currently being referred to as the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA)) will 
be created, which will be tasked with ensuring that banks and other financial services 
firms are financially sound (Masters, 2010, Osborne, 2010, Treasury, 2010). In 
addition, a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) will also be created, with the remit 
to prevent dangerous build-ups of credit or asset bubbles in the economy (Osborne, 
2010, Parker and Masters, 2010, Treasury, 2010). 
 
The consumer protection responsibility of the FSA will be transferred to the new 
consumer protection agency, which will be tasked with regulating the conduct of all 
financial services firms (including how products and services are sold to consumers) 
(Ross, 2010) and ensuring the integrity of the UK‟s financial markets (Elliott, 2010). 
 
An apparent advantage of this new institutional structure is that it brings the 
regulatory regime more in line with the „Twin Peaks‟ model of financial regulation, 
advocated by Taylor (1995) and currently in use in Australia. This model is 
advantageous because it advocates putting one regulator in charge of prudential 
supervision and another in charge of regulating the business conduct of financial 
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firms, thus avoiding a situation where a regulator is confused as to which objective to 
prioritise (Taylor, 1995). 
 
The second supposed advantage of the new institutional structure is that it satisfies the 
need to bridge the gap between macro-prudential policy, on the one hand, and micro-
prudential policy, on the other hand (Elliott, 2010, King, 2010). This has been 
described as necessary because “monetary stability and financial stability are two 
sides of the same coin” (King, 2010). 
 
There are, however, a number of criticisms that can be made of the new changes, even 
at this early stage. The first is that the changes do not address one of the most 
significant factors that must be taken into account in any attempt to improve financial 
regulation- the need for robust supervision and implementation of regulatory 
objectives. It can be argued that the institutional structure or organisational structure 
is only one factor in achieving good regulation, and that other potentially more 
important factors are the quality and ability of the regulator‟s staff (Masters, 2010, 
Parker and Masters, 2010). Altering the institutional structure of the regulatory regime 
without addressing the fundamental problems of flawed regulatory philosophy and 
inadequate supervision by the regulator is unlikely to generate significant 
improvements in the regulation of UK financial services. 
 
The second criticism relates to consumer protection in particular- the coalition 
government appears to have given very little consideration to how the new consumer 
protection agency will carry out its consumer protection functions. It has, for 
example, been argued that putting the market integrity responsibility alongside the 
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consumer protection function appears to be merely an afterthought (Parker and 
Masters, 2010), thus giving the impression that both consumer protection and 
maintaining market integrity are not considered, by the coalition government, to be as 
important as prudential supervision of the financial system. 
 
The third criticism is that the coalition government has also failed to clarify what the 
regulatory philosophy of the new consumer protection agency will be- if it carries on 
with the FSA‟s new philosophy of intensive supervision then it will be more 
interventionist in its approach, and this will potentially be advantageous for 
consumers of UK financial products and services. If, on the other hand, it adopts neo-
classical economic ideas that Conservative governments adopted in the past then it 
will rely on non-interventionist approaches such as information disclosure, caveat 
emptor and the promotion of competition, and this could potentially be 
disadvantageous for consumers of UK financial products and services.     
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the approaches to consumer protection in UK financial 
services. It has used the literature on Behavioural economics and Psychology as the 
basis for a critique of the UK‟s approach to consumer protection in the area of 
financial services. This literature shows that, contrary to the belief, in neo-classical 
economics, that people make rational choices, individuals in fact do not always make 
rational choices. The use of heuristics results in cognitive weaknesses in individuals‟ 
decision-making, leading them to make inferior decisions with regard to their welfare. 
This suggests that interventionist approaches to consumer protection are preferable to 
non-interventionist ones, because they take into account the fact that individuals‟ 
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decisions are not always rational or in their best interests. Other factors that support 
the argument that interventionist approaches are better than non-interventionist ones 
include the problem of information inadequacy, the existence of information 
asymmetry between sellers (suppliers) and buyers (consumers), the problem of lack of 
competition (among sellers or suppliers of financial services products) and the 
potential for fraud or deception.  
 
The FSA has taken steps to improve its overall approach to supervision, and its 
approach to consumer protection has become more interventionist. The fact that the 
FSA will be replaced in the near future does, however, throw up questions regarding 
what the approach to consumer protection in UK financial services will be in the 
future. The failure of non-interventionist approaches in the recent past does, however, 
show that future efforts at consumer protection in financial services ought to be more 
interventionist in nature rather than non-interventionist. 
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